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THE REMARKABLE STORY OF NATO EXPANSION A lot has been written about how the process of NATO’s first expansion developed from the early 1990’s until the accession ceremony held almost exactly ten years ago today. However, much less is known about the role American ethnic communities played in the long process. Today, I’d like to tell you how one such organization - the Hungarian American Coalition - became a committed advocate and participant in NATO enlargement. The Coalition was founded in 1991 after the long-hoped-for fall of communism, to represent the interests of the Hungarian American community. We, Hungarians together with millions of ethnic Americans hailing from Central and Eastern Europe wanted to seize the opportunity to assure the security and freedom of our former homeland within the framework of Western Europe. We came to recognize, that our fervent hope matched U.S. security interests in the region: we all wanted an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe to replace the strategic vacuum created by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. President Clinton certainly recognized early on that by promoting the reintegration of the most developed new democracies to the Western European community, NATO’s wider sphere of influence would serve both European and American security interests. As a bonus, his early espousal of NATO enlargement would gain the support of millions of voters of Central and Eastern European heritage. And there were a lot of voters in this category: 20 million American citizens who soon formed a multi-ethnic umbrella organization in order to advocate NATO’s eastward expansion with a stronger voice. The CEEC – Central and Eastern European Coalition was established to coordinate the efforts of 17 national organizations made up of Ukrainians, Poles, Balts, Slovaks, Hungarian, Romanian, and others. Naturally, our Hungarian American Coalition was an active member. In January of 1994 the Clinton administration began a dialogue in Milwaukee with 20 leaders of the ethnic communities of the four Visegrád countries. We attended the meeting expecting to hear about NATO expansion. But during three-hours of heated conversation with Sandy Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, and Dan Fried, Director of ECE for the National Security Council, and eventually Vice President Gore, we were presented another option – Partnership for Peace. Many of us present expressed strong reservations about the administration’s suggested requirement that the Visegrád countries participate in Partnership for Peace as a first step on the road to eventual NATO membership. We feared this represented a pull-back from the original NATO plan; it yielded to Russian fears of isolation and of rising nationalism; it gave no criteria or timetable for NATO expansion; and it did not provide the much-desired NATO commitment to mutual defense of member nations. Many similar meetings followed in 1994 and 95. For me the most memorable one took place in March, 1994. At this meeting Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, a Russian expert who wanted to slow the NATO expansion process, told us ethnic leaders that in his opinion a reformed Russia will not represent a threat to its former satellites.” He went on: “The question is – what kind of Russia will we have in the 21st century? YOU feel Russia will revert to type and foresee a dangerous scenario; we see Russia more positively… building a benign democratic system.” Many of us strongly argued this point. Finally, the 80 year old Dir. of the Polish American Congress, Jan Novak, posed two questions to Mr. Talbott: “Why did you invite us here, sir, if you think our experience with communism makes us unable to form a credible opinion about Russia?’ and more importantly, “What will happen, Mr. Talbott, if WE are right, and YOU are wrong?” In retrospect, despite our fears, Partnership for Peace proved to be a very successful arrangement for integration and training.. In 1995 a logistical base opened in Taszár, Hungary, to support US military operations in Bosnia. Eventually, Partnership for Peace involved 27 nations with participation in more than 1000 multilateral military training exercises. But public opinion, and a number of policy experts as well as prominent journalists – Thomas Friedman of the NY Times and others – continued to question the wisdom of NATO membership for the Central European nations. Many felt such action would alienate Russia and weaken President Yeltsin’s position; others feared NATO’s military effectiveness would be diluted by the entry of new members. There was great concern whether Russia would be given a voice in future NATO expansions or major NATO decisions. In May, 1997, a Russia-NATO Summit was held and the NATO-Russia Founding Act defined areas of cooperation between Russia and NATO. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright assured the Central Europeans that Russia would have a “voice but not a veto.” On July 8, 1997, at the Madrid NATO Summit invitations were finally extended to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO. The proposal required all 16 NATO members to ratify the entry of new members, including a two-thirds vote in the U.S. Senate. In the meanwhile, during my and other Coalition leaders’ visits to Hungary, it became obvious that Hungarians did not fully understand the stakes and many remained opposed to the idea of Hungary in NATO. Some wished for a status of neutrality; others considered this a dangerous, false hope. Many opposed any kind of foreign influence: to our chagrin they equated potential NATO presence in Hungary with that of the hated Soviet military! There was an active anti-NATO group, the Alba Circle, and the small but loud Labor Party was also a strong opponent. When Prime Minister Horn decided to hold a referendum on the subject in November, 1997, we knew we would have to get involved in planning an informational campaign to enable Hungarian voters to cast an educated vote. Although we had planned to do our educational project from SEED funds, in February of 1997, we were faced with a major setback. Public funds were suddenly not available to us, so unless we raised the necessary funds, we would have to give up our Hungarian project. We managed to reschedule, redesign and streamline our project after an enormous effort to raise the funds needed from foundations and corporations in record time! Our sponsors included The German Marshall Fund, the Ronald Lauder Foundation, Malév Hungarian Airlines, the U.S. Mission in Budapest, and our primary Hungarian partner, the Hungarian Atlantic Forum. With the Hungarian referendum scheduled to be held November 16, 1997, our plan was to organize conferences in three cities in Hungary, entitled “Hungary in an Expanded NATO: Benefits and Responsibilities-an Open Discussion with the Hungarian People.” The conferences featured thirty-eight speakers, including outstanding political, economic and military experts from Hungary, NATO, Western Europe and the United States. They included: Lt. Gen. Nicholas Kehoe, Deputy Chairman of the Military Comm. of NATO and Chris Donnelly, Special Advisor to the Secretary General of NATO; Hungarian Ambassador to the U.S., György Bánlaki and Hungarian Ambassador to NATO, András Simonyi; former Hungarian Ambassador to the U.S., Géza Jeszenszky, U.S. Ambassador Donald Blinken, Hungarian Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Ferenc Végh, Ms. Gina Marie Hatheway, Foreign Affairs Advisor to Ohio Senator Mike deWine, István Csicsery-Rónay, Miklós Derer, Sec. Gen. of the Hungarian Atlantic Forum. When President Árpád Göncz opened the first conference at the Hungarian Parliament on November 6, all Hungarian political parties declared their support for Hungary’s NATO membership. On November 8 a full-day conference was held at the historic Reformed College in Debrecen, while the venue for the third conference was Lilafüred, outside Miskolc, on November 10. In both cities the speakers participated in a Town Hall Meeting format where both opponents and supporters asked dozens of questions. The conference series received extensive national and local media coverage in Hungary. Our Hungarian NGO partners were most enthusiastic. They included the Hungarian Academy of Science, the Hungarian Atlantic Council, The 1945 Foundation, The Lajos Batthyány Foundation, Paul Forgacs Foundation, the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Democracy after Communism Foundation. I could relate so many stories of these conferences, but I will share only one with you. An important part in educating the Hungarian electorate in a non-partisan way was to invite both proponents and opponents of NATO membership to the conferences. In Miskolc, where the local Labor Party was an active opponent, an older man came up to me, and said, apologetically: “My dear lady, I hope you realize that I am going to have to disagree with you?” “Yes,” I replied, “that is why you have been invited.” He respectfully kissed my hand, and shaking his head, walked away: ”This is just unheard of in Hungary!” Then he proceeded to voice his opposition, until members of the audience told him he was simply wrong, and what would he tell his grandson about why he voted against a secure future for him? The Hungarian referendum took place on Nov. 16, 1997 and with just over 50% of the population voting, 85% supported NATO membership for Hungary! This was a significant result, as American opponents of NATO expansion would have been able to use defeat in Hungary as an effective argument in the U.S. Senate. On May 1st, 1998, the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty with a vote of 80:19. The following spring, Coalition leaders were invited to attend the historic signing ceremony marking the formal accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The event took place on March 12, 1999, in Independence, Missouri, where in 1949 President Truman announced the initial creation of NATO. Soon thereafter, in April, 1999, the Hungarian American Coalition co-hosted with the Potomac Foundation a Gala Dinner commemorating both the Fiftieth Anniversary of NATO's founding and the accession of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to the Alliance. US President Bill Clinton and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán served as Honorary Patrons of the Gala Dinner. En route to the formal celebration at the White House, Prime Minister Orbán and the Hungarian delegation delivered a special greeting to Gala Dinner participants.
Throughout my remarks, I have consistently
used the pronoun “we.” You can well imagine that the level of activity
generated by our Coalition to promote NATO expansion involved the
efforts of many people. Please allow me to mention some of them: I am deeply grateful for the friendship and support of Marilyn di Giacobbe, White House Public Liaison, and of Dan Fried, who finally taught me the value of “little steps,” and never failed to return a phonecall, even when the message was one he knew I would not like! I recall long conversations with Steve Flanagan, Jim Holmes and other members of the Clinton Administration, whose understanding of the need for NATO expansion provided great help in our efforts. also remember with great respect our three wonderful Polish partners who taught all of us a great deal, lived a life of service and devotion to Poland, and who today must be having a celestial commemoration above! Jan Nowak and Myra and Caz Lenard. As I looked back at those years of concentrated work on the issue of NATO expansion, I feel every moment was well worth it! We, Hungarian Americans, are indeed fortunate to have lived and worked in a moment of historic opportunity, of having been able to make a significant contribution to history coming full circle: After 50 years of great suffering and forced absence, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, through their membership in NATO, finally returned to the Western world. Back to the English press release
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